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Abstract 
This paper examines some of the reasons behind the decisions of states on whether or not they 
chose to expand state Medicaid programs to include all individuals up to 138% of the federal 
poverty line following the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
What follows is a mixed methods study on the quantitative impact of both cost and ideology on 
Medicaid expansion decisions for states with Republican governors during the first expansion 
years as well as a more expansive qualitative analysis of the conditions surrounding two select 
cases. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A lot of attention has been gathered in the news lately pertaining to the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act and its components. From the numerous attempts of Congress and the 
president to repeal and replace the legislation, to the passing of the expansion referendum of 
citizens in Maine, to the recent elimination of the individual mandate through the Republican tax 
bill. At a time like this, making decisions on the state level related to the ACA is an unnerving 
proceeding. Important pieces of the ACA that were vital to its success have been removed calling 
the entire future of this law into question. For instance, the ACA depended on the individual 
mandate to pull healthy citizens into the system to offset the costs of the less healthy citizens. 
Without it, premiums are likely to go up and many healthy young people are likely to opt out.  
Before this detrimental blow to the ACA, there was previous blow to the law that seemed 
almost just as unhinging. That setback came in the form of a Supreme Court decision that struck 
down the original provision of Medicaid expansion which essentially made Medicaid expansion 
mandatory for every state. When the Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to force 
states to expand Medicaid, Medicaid expansion then became a choice. The problem? The ACA is 
designed to work in a way that gives everyone access to affordable coverage. The bill that was 
passed depended on Medicaid to cover those up to at least 100% of the poverty line. When a 
state opts out of Medicaid expansion, they leave a gap of those who currently make too much to 
qualify for Medicaid and those make too little to qualify for market subsidies. The government 
tried to solve this problem by making an offer they believed the states could not refuse. The 
federal government offered to cover 100% of the costs of expansion until 2017 when they would 
incrementally cover less of the cost ending in 2020 with 90% cost coverage from then-on-out. 
Some states snatched up this offer while others rejected these funds. This paper attempts to look 
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into why certain states took that money, and why others left that money behind. Studying 
Medicaid Expansion is important not only because the program affects the lives of millions of 
Americans, but also because examining the reasons why some states expanded and others did not 
gives us an idea of how to overcome those circumstances when making future policy decisions. 
Any program the government makes optional to the states has the possibility of being rejected by 
the states, and examining the factors that lead states to opt-out of this program hopefully will 
help to better understanding of how to overcome those factors in the future in order to ideally 
create policy that every state will be on board with.  
In this paper, I will attempt to answer the question of what those conditions are that led 
states to either accept or reject federal funds for Medicaid Expansion. Chapter three will begin 
with a quantitative study of some potential factors that could have influenced state decision 
making including Medicaid implementation history, state demographics, health behavior, ability 
to pay, and political climate. Following the quantitative study, in chapter four is a qualitative 
study which examines the conditions of two neighboring states: North Dakota and South Dakota. 
There, the study takes a deeper look at four variables and how they differ between the two states. 
Those variables include budget and economy, the state of healthcare, demographics, and 
governor ideology. In chapter five, I will examine both the qualitative and quantitative studies to 
make sense of what variables in my research were the most likely to lead to the differing 
decisions between the states and what that could mean for policy making in the future. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
At the heart of my research there looms the question: why do policy makers make any 
decisions at all? Political scientists have posed many theories about why politicians make the 
decisions they make. One of the most common schools of thought in answering this question 
self-interest theory. Politicians have been described as acting in whatever way will secure them 
the most votes (Downs, 1957). David Mayhew furthered this notion by asserting the popular 
adage that legislators are merely “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 1974). This 
theory gained traction for many years, and is still a popular theory for explaining the decision 
making process of elected representatives; however, the pure self-interest theory may not do full 
justice to explaining the differences noted in the issue of Medicaid expansion. For example, one 
study tested public opinion on expansion to its likelihood of expanding (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 
2014). This study did not find a significant connection between public opinion of expansion in 
the governors’ states and those states decisions on Medicaid expansion. Self-interest theory, at 
least on its face, would seem to hold that governors would be responsive to public opinions on 
the issues at hand, as those constituents decide a governor’s future in office. It logically follows 
that, if politicians were solely self-interested, a governor would elect to expand Medicaid given 
the public demand of it is high, yet that does not appear to be the case based on the the relevant 
findings. This indicates that there is likely something else at play that is affecting the governors’ 
decisions on expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014). 
That said, there is another competing school of thought on the issue positing that perhaps 
ideas are the driving factor of politicians; for example, Steven Kelman argued that the “public 
spirit,” or the desire to implement good public policy, was not dead in politics. He argued that, 
while one characteristic of government officials is the desire for adulation, another, more distinct 
THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION 8 
characteristic to public servitude is the desire to participate in the formulation of good public 
policy (Kelman, 1987); Additionally, Robert Reich introduced the “power of public ideas” as an 
intervening force in decision making (Reich, 1988), and Lawrence Herson evaluated lenses 
through which people view policy (e.g. political culture frames, Madisonian frames, etc.) as 
contexts through which policy makers process political action (Herson, 1984). Altogether, many 
political scientists have crafted a persuasive argument that argues for the limitations of self-
interest theory as the sole determining factor for political decision making; Moreover, Jown W. 
Kingdon argues that there is neither empirical evidence that supports pure self-interest as 
sufficiently explaining officials voting behavior nor is there a solid theoretical framework for 
such an assumption to be made (Kingdon, 1993).  
Neither the theory of self-interest or of public spirit alone seem to explain exactly what is 
going on in the politics of Medicaid expansion. The reality is probably something of a mix 
between the two. The rationality that a politician uses in making decisions is probably a mix of 
his or her interests and theories about the world (what Vanberg and Buchanan labeled the 
“interest-component” and the “theory component”). To that end, policy decisions may be less 
about factual outcomes, and more about subjective evaluations of expected outcomes (Vanberg 
& Buchanan, 1989). This might hint to a more inclusive approach, such as the one presented in 
Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. This book presents the concept that 
representatives have 3 goals: (1) re-election, (2) power inside congress, and (3) good public 
policy (Fenno, 1978, p. 137). The best statement he provides to encapsulate all of this is when he 
says that representatives want to be a able to tell their audiences “’I am effectives for you’” (p. 
140). This shows the (1) desire to get re-elected, (2) demonstration of power inside congress, and 
(3) showing of good public policy by actually getting something done that benefits someone. 
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This paper interacts with questions about why politicians make decisions and thusly takes both 
the considerations of reelection and the politicians exemplified preferences into account when 
analyzing the factors that may have contributed to Medicaid expansion or lack thereof. In this 
paper, I examine both conditions that effect potential reelection along with the personal beliefs of 
governors of what constitutes good policy. My theory is that both reelection and personal beliefs 
motivated states’ decisions on whether or not to expand Medicaid. 
Dialing in from the broad framework of why any politician does anything, there is that 
specific question with relevance to this paper: why did certain states expand Medicaid while 
others did not?; This specific question received some attention from researchers; the studies of 
which has guided my work here. The first, and most encapsulating study is one this paper has 
already mentioned briefly, but should be explained more thoroughly seeing as how it is the most 
relevant to this study. “The Politics of Need: Examining Governors’ Decisions to Oppose the 
“Obamacare” Medicaid Expansion,” published in State Politics & Policy Quarterly, studies all 
50 states to test four hypotheses on why governors chose to expand Medicaid: (1) gubernatorial 
partisanship, (2) public opinion, (3) legislative partisanship, and (4) need (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 
2014). The study found strong evidence that gubernatorial partisanship and legislative 
partisanship were dominating factors in the outcome of whether or not a state chose to expand 
Medicaid. They found ambiguous evidence that public opinion on expansion had much to do 
with a state’s choice to expand; however, the most intriguing part for this paper was the fact that 
the researchers found evidence that could possibly support the opposite of what they expected for 
need. They found that the need for Medicaid expansion could perhaps have a negative effect on 
the outcome, i.e. when the state has a higher need for Medicaid expansion it is less likely to 
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expand. This paper plans to expand upon that finding and test a related concept, the price of 
fulfilling that need.  
The second study on why states chose to expand Medicaid was a qualitative piece on the 
circumstances that led to the adoption of Medicaid expansion in four states and one additional 
case where the state failed to expand (Rose, 2013). In this study, the focus on Republican led 
states was something that could be done with more attentiveness. The author argued that the 
previous quantitative study on the politics of Medicaid expansion lacked nuance. This is 
exemplified by the fact that since more and more Republican governors were buying into 
Medicaid expansion, it seemed as though executive and legislative partisanship could not be the 
only defining variable in whether or not a state chose to expand. The main takeaway from this 
study for this paper was that “strong gubernatorial support is necessary but not sufficient” for 
Medicaid Expansion (Rose, 2013). This finding still holds true seeing as how, while at least one 
state has been able to pass Medicaid expansion without the support of the legislature, no state has 
been able to expand Medicaid without the signing off of their governor. The results of this study 
influenced this paper to control for partisanship of the governor by specifically examining 
expansion decisions of states with Republican governors. It also influenced my research to 
accompany my quantitative study with a qualitative portion which would allow me to give more 
nuance to the results of my models. 
Another study into why states expanded Medicaid was done as a dissertation by Robin 
Flagg at the University of California, Berkeley. Her study of all 50 states focused on many of the 
same concepts as this paper (Flagg, 2014). Her study focused on seven characteristics of a state 
to identify how strong the effect was of each on the states’ decisions. Her factors were party, 
ideology, economics, state policy history, electoral pressures, interest groups, and personal 
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beliefs of the governor. She used the first six characteristics in a quantitative study referring to 
all 50 states, and then did a qualitative portion to more deeply analyze the situations surrounding 
Wisconsin and Ohio in a comparative analysis of the two states. Flagg claimed two major 
findings of her study (1) the Mayhew model of seeking reelection seems to hold for the case of 
Medicaid Expansion and (2) the mixed methods approach provides the needed nuance for a 
qualitative model (Flagg, 2014). As for Medicaid expansion, she found that electoral pressure 
was, under both models, the most significant factor in expansion decisions; moreover, she found 
that it seemed as though the governors she studied would use factors such as economics more as 
a justification for their choices, rather than a motivating factor (Flagg, 2014). My research 
attempts to examine whether or not this statement is true. It aims to examine a common reason 
governors cited for not expanding (cost) and to determine how much weight, if any, it truly had 
on expansion decisions. 
Benjamin Sommers and Arnold Epstein did an additional study categorizing the reasons 
given by the governors for their decisions on whether or not to expand Medicaid (Sommers & 
Epstein, 2013). They gathered information on the Governor’s views on Medicaid expansion pre-
2012 election and post-2012 election to see if they differed. They found that after Obama was 
elected for another term, there was a handful of states that changed their standings on Medicaid 
Expansion. After gathering that information, they looked at the statements the governors gave for 
their decisions and tallied the common themes from those who opposed expansion, those who 
supported expansion, and those who were undecided about expansion. The highest correlated 
theme was from the opposing group, 92% of those who opposed Medicaid expansion gave 
concerns about the state budget. This was the highest correlation in any category. The highest in 
supporting governors was 78% (reasoning: Medicaid will help the uninsured) and in undecided 
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governors was 75% (reasoning: need for more information). This shows that, taking the 
governors; words, almost every governor who decided not to expand claimed to do so, at least 
partially, on financial bases. This study attempts to examine the validity of that claim as a 
motivating factor in expansion decisions. 
Discussion 
 These studies have established a few discernable conditions that characterize Medicaid 
expansion. Out of all the findings of any of the studies, by far the strongest was that 
gubernatorial partisanship plays a huge role in Medicaid expansion decisions (Barrilleaux & 
Rainey, 2014; Rose, 2013). This finding strongly holds in reality seeing as how every state with 
both a Democratic governor accompanied with the means to expand (i.e. a Democratic 
legislature) has managed to expand Medicaid in his/her state. But what about those states who 
did not have Democratic governors and still managed to expand? We could then look a second, 
less strong, but still very significant finding, which is legislative partisanship; however, there are 
still states with Republican governors who did not have a Democratic legislature and still 
managed to pass through expansion legislation. A separate strong characteristic uncovered by 
these studies was that states who choose not to expand care a great deal about costs (Sommers & 
Epstein, 2013). The study that follows was greatly influenced by these findings and set out to 
examine what could explain the differences of states if one holds that gubernatorial partisanship 
constant, whether those differences could be explained by the costs cited by the governors or 
difference of ideology within those states. This method differs from the studies preceding it in 
that it does not concern itself with all 50 states, but rather, it concerns itself only with Republican 
ones. This study aims to analyze the differences between those states in order to find out why 
they differ in their policy outcomes. My theory is that both cost and ideology/partisanship will 
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have an effect on the states’ decisions to expand, but I predict ideology and partisanship will play 
a much heavier role. I will discuss how I plan to test this theory in more detail in chapter three.  
THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION 14 
Chapter 3: Quantitative Study 
3.1 Methodology 
 In order to set out answering the question of why states with the same gubernatorial 
partisanship differed in expansion decisions, this question was broken into two separate 
questions. The first is: does the cost mentioned by governors actually matter in who does and 
who does not expand? It is well known that it was certainly on the minds of lawmakers. After all, 
the top two priorities for state lawmakers at the start of 2013 were stabilizing budgets and 
addressing health care (Wolf, 2013). And since it was almost a unanimous reason for not 
expanding, it is important to study the validity of this claim. Along this line of reasoning, 
perhaps it could be that the states who did not expand did so because it would be costlier for 
them than their expanding counterparts. This study seeks to determine whether it is possible that 
expansion was cheaper for certain states than others, and whether or not that may be why they 
expanded. My research seeks to test whether or not these conditions were a motivating factor for 
governors or whether they were simply used as an ex post facto justification for expansion 
decisions, as was suggested by Flagg (Flagg, 2014). I hypothesize that this variable will have 
some effect on expansion decisions, but that political climate will have a stronger effect.  
The second question is: can political climate still explain the differences between states, 
even when gubernatorial partisanship is held constant? Under this question, this study examines 
whether or not it could be that some states are “less Republican” than others – meaning they fall 
closer to the left on the political spectrum than their counterparts – and whether or not that 
impacted expansion decisions. Under this theory, perhaps it is possible that these states are less 
conservative, and that is why they expanded. I hypothesize that political climate will not only 
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have an effect on expansion decisions, but also that the effect will be stronger than that of ability 
to pay. 
In order to address these questions, I selected my cases to control for the evidence that 
gubernatorial partisanship affects the outcome of expansion (Barrilleaux & Rainey, 2014; Rose, 
2013). Since there is a diversity in Republican governors’ decisions, it made sense to study only 
states with Republican governors. For the sake of simplicity, this paper is not studying those who 
elected to partake is a section 1115 waivers. Section 1115 waivers allow states to implement 
alternative methods of covering persons up to 138% of the poverty line using the federal funds 
offered for Medicaid expansion. These waivers can be used by states to cover those persons in 
the coverage gap without putting those persons on Medicaid. While these waivers do help 
provide coverage to the persons who would have benefitted from Medicaid expansion, they are 
not here considered Medicaid expansion as they do not expand the actual state Medicaid 
program. Additionally, due to the fact that this study is based off of data that surrounded 2014, 
the first year expansion was implemented; it does not include Maine. Maine was not put into this 
study due to its recent passage of a referendum which, if upheld by the legislature, would bypass 
the Republican governor in expanding Medicaid in the state of Maine. Since this referendum has 
not finished its legislative life, and it is unclear what is going to happen in that state, Maine is not 
included in this study. Nebraska is not included in this study either as they have a nonpartisan 
legislature in which it is not possible to gather information on party affiliation of the members. 
This made me unable to use Nebraska since I could not run it in any models that included 
political climate. This left the study with 19 cases of non-expanding states and 5 cases of 
expanding states. The non-expanding states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
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and Wyoming. The expanding states being Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
and Ohio (Table 1). 
It is important to note the limitations of these models before going any further. All the 
models done contained the states relevant to this study. Due to this low number of cases, the 
functions created for testing the variables could only handle a maximum of two independent 
variables, and in a few case, the model allowed for three. This severely limited the ability of the 
models to control for variables as only one control variable could be included in the model with 
any given independent variable being tested. For this reason, in order to examine ability to pay 
and political climate in the same model, factor analysis was used to create a measure of both the 
ability to pay variable and the political climate variable in order to combine the many factors that 
go into each variable and measure them in the same function. 
For the first factor, information was collected on cost of Medicaid expansion and ability 
to pay. These variables included cost of Medicaid, a measure of the economy, and a measure of 
the future economy (GDP growth). Because state populations and budgets are different, the cost 
was measured in the projected increase to each state’s spending rather than sheer dollar amounts; 
additionally, because Medicaid expansion is something that becomes increasingly more 
expensive for the states as time goes on, GDP growth was used as a measure for a states future 
ability to pay. As a direct measure of comparing the economies, a ranking system of one through 
fifty was used in order to examine a direct comparison of what states’ economies looked like 
next to other states’ economies. This information was compiled and a factor analysis was used to 
give each state a cost score so that it all this information could be consolidated in order to fit into 
the main model.  
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Table 1: Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions as of November 8, 2017 
State Expansion Conditions of Expansion Governor 
Alabama  Not Participating  Republican 
Alaska  Participating Traditional Independent 
Arizona  Participating Alternative Republican 
Arkansas  Alternative Alternative Democrat 
California  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Colorado  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Connecticut  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Delaware  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Florida  Not Participating  Republican 
Georgia  Not Participating  Republican 
Hawaii  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Idaho  Not Participating  Republican 
Illinois  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Indiana  Participating Alternative Republican 
Iowa  Participating Alternative Republican 
Kansas  Not Participating  Republican 
Kentucky  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Louisiana  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Maine*  Undecided*  Republican* 
Maryland  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Massachusetts  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Michigan  Participating Alternative Republican 
Minnesota  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Mississippi  Not Participating  Republican 
Missouri  Not Participating  Democrat 
Montana  Participating Alternative Democrat 
Nebraska  Not Participating  Republican 
Nevada  Participating Traditional Republican 
New Hampshire  Participating Alternative Democrat 
New Jersey  Participating Traditional Republican 
New Mexico  Participating Traditional Republican 
New York  Participating Traditional Democrat 
North Carolina  Not Participating  Republican 
North Dakota  Participating Traditional Republican 
Ohio  Participating Traditional Republican 
Oklahoma  Not Participating  Republican 
Oregon  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Pennsylvania  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Rhode Island  Participating Traditional Independent 
South Carolina  Not Participating  Republican 
South Dakota  Not Participating  Republican 
Tennessee  Not Participating  Republican 
Texas  Not Participating  Republican 
Utah  Not Participating  Republican 
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State Expansion Conditions of Expansion Governor 
Vermont  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Virginia  Not Participating  Democrat 
Washington  Participating Traditional Democrat 
West Virginia  Participating Traditional Democrat 
Wisconsin**  Not Participating**    Alternative** Republican** 
Wyoming  Not Participating  Republican 
Sources: (Advisory Board Company, 2017) & (Ballotpoedia, 2018) 
*ME passed Medicaid expansion through ballot initiative. It is unclear at this point what 
the future course of action will be seeing as how the initiative still needs to go through 
the state legislature and has yet to be implemented 
**WI Medicaid covers all adults up to the 100% Federal Poverty Line, but did not adopt 
expansion 
 Following state economics, state ideology was analyzed. The variables included in 
ideology/partisanship were percent of the population of the state that identify as conservative, 
governor ideology, the governor’s margin of victory in the state’s elections, the state’s ranking 
on the state liberalism index, percent of Republicans in the lower legislative chamber of each 
state, and percent Republicans in the upper legislative chamber of each state. 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Medicaid Implementation History 
Before creating the main model, I ran a a series of preliminary models in order to address 
factors outside of economics and ideology that could have possibly affected expansion decisions. 
The first model ran pertains to the history of Medicaid implementation. Medicaid, as a program, 
was optional to the state, much like current Medicaid expansion. Within four years, nearly every 
state had implemented the program within their state. Researchers have argued that Medicaid 
expansion would follow the same path as Medicaid implementation, in that in a relatively short 
amount of time, all states would expand their programs (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2014). However, it 
only took Medicaid implementation about four years’ time, and, after a similar length of time, 
many states have still not opted in to expansion. The theory being that the states that took longer  
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Table 2: Medicaid Implementation Date Conversion 
State                                        Medicaid Implementation Date Index 
Hawaii Jan-66 1 
Illinois Jan-66 1 
Minnesota Jan-66 1 
North Dakota  Jan-66 1 
Oklahoma   Jan-66 1 
Pennsylvania  Jan-66 1 
California   Mar-66 2 
New York  May-66 3 
Connecticut  Jul-66 4 
Idaho  Jul-66 4 
Kentucky  Jul-66 4 
Louisiana Jul-66 4 
Maine Jul-66 4 
Maryland Jul-66 4 
Nebraska  Jul-66 4 
Ohio    Jul-66 4 
Rhode Island Jul-66 4 
Utah  Jul-66 4 
Vermont   Jul-66 4 
Washington   Jul-66 4 
West Virginia Jul-66 4 
Wisconsin  Jul-66 4 
Massachusetts   Sep-66 5 
Delaware   Oct-66 6 
Michigan   Oct-66 6 
New Mexico   Dec-66 7 
Kansas    Jun-67 8 
Iowa     Jul-67 9 
Montana   Jul-67 9 
Nevada  Jul-67 9 
New Hampshire Jul-67 9 
Oregon    Jul-67 9 
Wyoming Jul-67 9 
Texas     Sep-67 10 
Georgia  Oct-67 11 
Missouri  Oct-67 11 
South Dakota  Oct-67 11 
South Carolina  Jul-68 12 
Colorado Jan-69 13 
Tennessee   Jan-69 13 
Virginia  Jul-69 14 
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State                                        Medicaid Implementation Date Index 
Alabama   Jan-70 15 
Arkansas   Jan-70 15 
Florida   Jan-70 15 
Indiana  Jan-70 15 
Mississippi  Jan-70 15 
New Jersey  Jan-70 15 
North Carolina Jan-70 15 
Alaska   Jul-72 16 
Arizona   Oct-82 17 
Source: (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012) 
 
to implement Medicaid Expansion in the first place are less likely to have expanded their 
Medicaid programs yet. In order to examine if the states were following such a cycle, I took the 
original implementation dates for each of the 19 states in this study to see if that had a 
statistically significant effect on predicting Medicaid expansion. I arranged the dates in 
numerical order from 1 to 17, January 1966 being the first date and October 1982 being the last 
date (Table 2). The dependent variable is the same in all of these models where “Expand” is 
coded 1 and “Did not Expand” is coded 0. This model found no statistical significance of history 
of implementation on Medicaid Expansion (Table 3). The results of this model found no 
evidence to support the claim that Medicaid expansion is following the cycle of Medicaid 
implementation. This could possibly be a cause of concern for those who are in favor of 
Medicaid expansion, as it does not provide any evidence that all states will eventually expand 
their Medicaid programs. 
3.2.2 Demographics 
The second model I ran was on demographics of the states. Previous research has 
suggested a link between social assistance programs and race. One study published in State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly found a relationship between race and immigration status with 
programs like Medicaid and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) (Filindra, 2013). 
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Many of the states that did not expand Medicaid were located in the South, in states which tend 
to have higher African American and Hispanic populations, so perhaps Medicaid expansion 
could be tied to race and ethnicity. The theory being that the higher the minority population, the 
less likely the state is to expand Medicaid. In order to examine whether or not the issue of 
Medicaid expansion had something to do with the racial make-up of the state, I ran a bivariate 
logit function using the non-white makeup of a state, the percentage of the population of each 
state that did not identify as white on the 2010 census as the independent variable (Table 3). The 
model for this information found no statistically significant effect for this measure. The results of 
this model found no statistically significant relationship between race or ethnicity and expansion 
decisions. 
3.2.3 Health 
The third factor this study considers is health of the states. The theory being that either 
healthier states are less likely to expand Medicaid because the citizens do not need it, or healthier 
states are more likely to expand because the cost of covering those individuals will be lower than 
the cost of a state covering, on average, less healthy individuals. In order to compare the states’ 
health levels, I utilized an index of state behavioral health rankings. This index is a combination 
of five behavioral health factors of all fifty states. These five variables measure citizen usage of 
tobacco, alcohol, and firearms as well as STD rates and weight information including the 
overweight population and those who do not exercise regularly (Rom, 2013). Rom used these 
variables to create a comparative overall rank of one to fifty, one being the healthiest state, and 
fifty being the least healthy state. I took the rankings for my cases and put them in a logit 
function in the same way as the previous models, making my dependent variable expansion 
(Table 3). This model once again found no statistical significance. This suggest that the health of  
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the state was not on average a motivating factor for expansion decisions. 
All of the previous models only tested variables alone, so the next model ran was a logit 
function including all three preliminary variables: implementation date, demographics, and 
health (Table 3). This function included all of the factors and measured their combine effects 
with respect to expansion. This model found no statistically significant effect for any of the 
variables.  
3.2.4 Ability to Pay 
The next model measures factors impacting a state’s ability to pay for the cost of 
expansion. Many governors cited cost as a factor for not expanding, and this study aimed to 
analyze if there was a notable difference in cost between the states, seeing as how the states who 
did not expand were the only ones who frequently cited cost as a reason behind their decision 
(Sommers & Epstein, 2013). This study measured this variable by examining the estimated cost 
of Medicaid expansion that would fall onto the state, the state’s immediate ability to pay that 
amount as measured by the state’s economy, and the state’s future ability to pay by GDP growth.
 To measure increase in cost to the state, I used estimates from the Kaiser foundation 
Table 3: Measure of Preliminary Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.1803 
(1.0885) 
-1.03750 
(1.39593) 
-0.14643 
(1.24077) 
-0.09784 
(1.59326) 
Date -0.1385 
(0.1163) 
  -0.21561 
(0.15460) 
Demographics  0.03176 
(5.21600) 
 8.56747 
(7.92409) 
Health   -0.02905 
(0.03830) 
-0.03948 
(0.04670) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
Sources: (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012), (United States Census 
Bureau, 2011), & (Rom, 2013) 
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which measured estimated costs of expansion for each state (Holahan, Buettgens, & Carroll, 
2012). One limitation of this data is that the actual costs the states have incurred post-expansion 
have been higher than projected. While this could be a target for scrutiny, there has been no more 
accurate measure of actual costs, because while we can measure the real costs of states who have 
expanded, we cannot observe those costs for states whom have yet to expand. In that way, any 
measure of projected costs for non-expanding states will have some measure of inaccuracy. 
Additionally, during the times in which expansion decisions were being made, this is the data 
that would have been available to the states and their governors, so these likely would have been 
the numbers affecting the decision for expansion and not the real cost of expansion.  
As for a measure of state economic health, I used a ranking from CNBC which ranked 
the states’ economies from one to fifty – one being the best economy, and 50 being the worst 
economy. What I was attempting to capture in this measure was what kind of position the state 
was in to be taking on additional costs. A state with a better economy hypothetically would be in 
a better position to expand Medicaid because it is financially in a position where it is producing 
more which means it can collect more tax revenue and has a low unemployment rate which 
means it is spending less on combatting unemployment. The measure I used for economy was 
taken from a large study of business friendliness and includes a combination of variables 
including the unemployment rate, GDP per capita, and state bond rating (CNBC LLC, 2013). For 
ease of interpretation, I inverted the rankings of this index so that one was the worst economy 
and 50 was the best economy. That way, if a positive relationship shows up in the model, it will 
indicate support for my theory that a state with a better ability to pay for expansion is more likely 
to expand Medicaid. 
Lastly, a measure for GDP growth was added as, under the current system of  
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expansion, the more time passes, the higher percentage of the cost of expansion the state has to 
take on (Woodruff, Wang, & Aversa, 2013). The measure of GDP growth provides insight into 
how capable the state in the future will be to cover the rising costs of expansion. Under my 
theory, the higher GDP growth, the more likely the state will be to expand. 
These three measures of ability to pay allowed the study to analyze the effect on 
expansion of (1) the estimated cost, (2) the immediate ability of a state to take on increased costs, 
and (3) the projected future ability of the state to pay further increased costs. As for the model 
itself, I put each of these factors together into a logit function (Table 4). None of these variables 
on their own had significance; however, when all of the factors were combined into one model, 
the economy variable stood out as statistically significant at the 90 percent level. This could 
indicate that, all other cost factors taken into account, the current state of the economy was more 
influential in expansion decisions than the anticipated cost or future prospects; however, what is 
so interesting about this model is that it indicates that the worse the economy, the more likely the 
state was to expand. This could possibly be explained by states having a desire for an influx of 
federal dollars into the market to boost the economy. After all, opting into Medicaid expansion 
Table 4: Measures of Ability to Pay 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.5917 
(1.7947) 
0.38021 
(1.07676) 
-1.5178** 
(0.7348) 
0.78157 
(2.50400) 
Budget Increase -0.2397 
(0.2546) 
  0.05792 
(0.33310) 
Economy  -0.05343 
(0.03837) 
 -0.10957* 
(0.05788) 
GDP Growth   0.1795 
(0.1828) 
0.50016 
(0.31526) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
Sources: (Holahan, Buettgens, & Carroll, 2012), (CNBC LLC, 2013), & (Woodruff, Wang, & 
Aversa, 2013) 
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means a large sum of money coming into a state economy from outside its borders. This sudden 
increase in spending could present an opportunity to law makers to claim whatever benefits 
Medicaid expansion affords the state’s economy. The results from the table do support my theory 
that these variables are related to expansion decisions, but do not support my hypothesis that the 
better ability to pay, the more likely the state is to expand Medicaid. Instead, the evidence 
suggests that economy works in the opposite direction of what I predicted.  
This increase in the economy, however, may not come without costs for many law 
makers as social welfare programs are viewed less favorably in more conservative circles than 
others. In that way, the benefits Medicaid expansion could bring to the economy may not be 
outweighed by the increase in social welfare programs within the minds of certain constituents. 
In order to analyze whether or not this theory is true, I test this in the subsequent model. 
3.2.4 Political Climate 
 This model measures the state’s political climate. The political climate variables consist 
of six measures: citizen ideology, conservative makeup of the upper house, conservative makeup 
of the lower house, state policy conservatism, the ideology of the governor, and the governor’s 
electoral margin of victory. I first measured each of these variables by themselves to analyze 
their effects individually and then placed into a factor analysis measure their combined effect on 
expansion decisions. For the first measure of citizen ideology, the data were taken from a survey 
of citizens across the U.S. done by Gallup. This survey measures what percentage of the 
residents of any given state, on average, identify as liberal, independent, or conservative (Gallup, 
Inc., 2017). This measure was included to gauge the ideology of the constituency of the states in 
the study. Social programs are typically viewed less favorably by conservatives, so 
hypothetically politicians whose goal is to get reelected would be less likely to expand because it 
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would not please their constituency. In order to measure this hypothesis, I placed the measure of 
the percent of residents of each state who identify as conservative into a logit function with 
expansion the same way as all of the previous models (Table 6). This measure, when measured 
individually, came out as statistically significant at the 95 percent level. The outcome did follow 
the predictions as well; the variable had a negative relationship with expansion – signifying that 
the more conservative a state was, the less likely the state was to expand Medicaid.  
 The second variable I chose to measure the state’s political climate was to measure the 
states’ legislative bodies. This variable was measured in two parts, the makeup of both the lower 
chamber (here called the house) and the upper chamber (here called the senate) were taken and 
the portion of seats in each body held by Republicans was converted to a percentage (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2013). The hypothesis is that, since the Republican party is the 
party representative of conservative ideology in the United States, and since conservatives do not 
generally favor social programs, Republican legislators will have will be less likely to expand 
Medicaid. To model this, I placed the percentages of Republican legislative makeup into a logit 
function similarly to the models above with expansion as the dependent variable (Table 6). Each 
of these measures came out as statistically significant. The results of the Republican makeup in 
the senate were significant at the 90 percent level and the results of the house were significant at 
the 95 percent level. Each of these measures had a negative relationship with expansion, aligning 
with the hypothesis that a state with a more Republican legislature would be less likely to expand 
Medicaid in their state.  
 The third variable in measuring state political climate is state policy conservatism. State 
conservatism indicates the policy history of a state. This variable came from a policy liberalism 
index which ranks states on a series of policy categories ranging from abortion laws to tax  
THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION 27 
Table 5: Measures of Governor Ideology 
State Economic Score Social score Combined 
Alabama 80 10 70 
Florida 90 30 60 
Georgia 80 10 70 
Idaho 90 10 80 
Kansas 90 20 70 
Mississippi 80 30 50 
Nevada 60 50 10 
New Jersey 70 50 20 
New Mexico 50 30 20 
North Carolina 80 40 40 
North Dakota 60 50 10 
Ohio 80 40 40 
Oklahoma 90 30 60 
South Carolina 90 30 60 
South Dakota 60 30 30 
Tennessee 60 30 30 
Texas 80 10 70 
Utah 70 40 30 
Wyoming 80 20 60 
Source: (OnTheIssues, 2018) 
 
progressivity, and then it takes all of those categories and ranks the state from one to fifty –  
one being the state with the most liberal/least conservative policies, and fifty being the state with 
the least liberal/most conservative policies (Gray, 2013). This variable is meant to capture the  
 general ideological natural of policies within a state. I hypothesize that the more conservative a 
state, the less likely they will be to expand Medicaid as expansion is considered a liberal policy. I 
ran this variable in a logit function as the previous variables were (Table 6). These results were 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level, and they had a negative relationship with 
expansion – meaning the more conservative a state’s policy history, the less likely they are to 
expand Medicaid. This makes sense as Medicaid expansion is a liberal policy, and, if a state  
historically has more conservative policies, it makes sense that they would be less likely to adopt  
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Figure 1: Governor Ideology Index 
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a liberal policy like Medicaid expansion. 
The fourth variable is the ideology of the governor. Since the governor has to sign off on 
expansion (unless the state legislature overrides the governor’s veto, which has yet to happen), 
the governor has the ultimate say on expansion decisions. All of the governors in this   
study are Republican, but even governors with the same partisanship can have varying 
ideologies. To measure this difference, I combine two different measures of governor ideology to 
create one measure. The source of these indexes coded them in the opposite direction, so the first 
measure was one of the governors’ stances on economic policy from 0 to 100 – the closer to 100, 
the more economically conservative the governor. The second measure was one of the 
governors’ stances on social policy from 0 to 100 – This time, the closer to 100, the more social 
liberal the governor. In order to create one variable out of these two, the social score was 
subtracted from the economic score (Table 5). The final measure indicated that governors with a 
lower score are more moderate than states with a higher score; score of zero represents 
a perfectly moderate governor, and a score of 100 represents a perfectly conservative governor 
(Figure 1). To model the effect of this variable, I again put this measure into a logit function 
(Table 6). This model found that governor ideology was significant at the 90 percent level. It had 
a negative relationship with expansion; following suit with the hypothesis, the more conservative  
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Table 6: Measures of Political Climate 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 17.4605* 
(8.9936) 
7.104 
(4.469) 
6.987 * 
(3.887) 
5.8380 
(3.6897) 
4.58209 * 
(2.69294) 
4.58628 
(5.68553) 
Constituency -0.4669** 
(0.2315) 
     
Senate  -12.274 * 
(6.791) 
    
House   -13.023** 
(6.358) 
   
Policy 
Conservatism 
   -0.2042 * 
(0.1095) 
  
Gov. Ideology     -0.16437 * 
(0.08929) 
 
Gov. Margin      -0.09775 
(0.09969) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
Sources: (Gallup, Inc., 2017) (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013), , 
(Ballotpoedia, 2018), (Gray, 2013), & (OnTheIssues, 2018) 
 
the governor, the less likely the state was to expand Medicaid. This outcome follows the same  
pattern as the previous variables in that, the more conservative the conditions of a state, the less 
likely a state is to expand Medicaid. 
The last variable in state political climate was competitiveness of the gubernatorial race. I 
measured this variable by the percentage of the vote each state governor received in their state 
race. The theory behind this variable is that either governors with lower margins of victory will 
be less secure in their position and potential reelection and that this insecurity will affect their 
decisions in office or they will expand Medicaid in an attempt to appear more moderate so that 
they can appeal to a wider voter base. To test this theory, margin of victory was put into a logit 
function with expansion (Table 6). This model found no evidence to support the theory that 
margin of victory affected a state’s expansion decisions as no statistically significant relationship 
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between margin of victory and expansion. This result does not support my theory that the higher 
the margin of victory, the less likely the state is to expand Medicaid. 
 As for the final model, I wanted to test if cost and economy mattered in relation to 
partisanship and ideology. Given the limitations of my study due to the low number of 
observations, I could only include two inputs into my logit function for examining expansion. 
What I did in order to examine the effects of these variables was to collect the multiple factors on 
ideology and partisanship as well as multiple factors on cost and economy. For political climate, 
the factor analysis included all the previously mentioned variables: percent of the population of 
the state that identify as conservative, percent of Republicans in the house of each state, percent 
Republicans in the senate of each state, the state’s ranking on the state liberalism index, the 
governor’s ideology as well as the governor’s margin of victory in the state’s elections. I 
combined these variables via a factor analysis to create a score for each state on ideology – the 
higher the score, the more right-leaning the state. For the ability to pay, I ran a factor analysis 
including the projected budget increase of expansion, the economic ranking, and the measure of 
GDP growth. The higher the factor score, the higher each of the measures of ability to pay. The 
final model ran each factor score individually then combined both the political climate factor 
score and ability to pay factor score the in the same logit function. Each logit function’s 
dependent variable was coded 1 for “Expand” and 0 for “Did not Expand” (Table 8).  The results 
of these models found consistently significant results for political climate and mixed results for 
ability to pay.  
As for political climate, the models found a statistically significant negative relationship 
both when it was measured alone, and when it was measured in congruence with ability to pay 
(Table 7). Political climate consistently and had a negative relationship with expansion –  
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meaning the more conservative a state, the less likely they were to expand. Ability to pay 
achieved mixed results. On its own, it had no relationship, but when measured in the same model 
with political climate, it had a statistically significant positive relationship with expansion – 
meaning the higher the ability to pay variables, the more likely the state was to expand. The 
interesting thing about the results of ability to pay is the way the factor analysis loaded the 
variables included in ability to pay. I loaded the measure of economy and the measure of GDP 
increase in a way that increased the score, but it also loaded budget increase that way. This 
means that the higher the predicted increase in the budget, the higher the factor score. Ideally, 
budget increase would have been coded inversely of the other two variables, so that serves as a 
limitation of the ability to pay factor. This makes it harder to interpret the specific relationship 
the variables of cost, economy and GDP growth on expansion decisions. Altogether, these model 
supports the hypothesis that more conservative states are less likely to expand; however, it 
provides less clear evidence for the hypothesis that a better ability to pay. 
 
Table 7: Measures of Ability to Pay and Political Climate 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -1.0651** 
(0.5400) 
-1.5510** 
(0.7599) 
-3.496* 
(1.854) 
Ability to Pay FA 0.5204 
( 0.5313) 
 2.440* 
(1.402) 
Political Climate FA  -1.9975** 
(0.9689) 
-5.213* 
(3.061) 
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001 
Sources: 
Ability to Pay FA - (Holahan, Buettgens, & Carroll, 2012), (CNBC LLC, 2013), (Woodruff, 
Wang, & Aversa, 2013) 
Political Climate FA - (Gallup, Inc., 2017) (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013), , 
(Ballotpoedia, 2018), (Gray, 2013), & (OnTheIssues, 2018) 
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3.3 Findings 
 Altogether, I tested 6 unique variables. (1) history of implementation, (2) demographics, 
(3) institutional power of the governor, (4) health behavior (5) political climate, and (6) ability to 
pay. Of those variables, the strongest appears to be political climate. In every model, the 
measures of political climate were significant, and when all put together, political climate held its 
significance in the final models. Ability to pay does not have as clear of an effect; the measures 
of cost have differentiating effects across the board, making it difficult to tell what the 
relationship between these factors and expansion really looks like. It does not appear that 
expansion is directly related to one measure of the economy, but rather, has an unclear 
relationship with a combination of factors, if it has one at all. This may mean that the 
relationship between cost and expansion is more complex than was previously thought. This 
quantitative study supports the hypothesis that less conservative states are more likely to expand 
Medicaid as measures of this variable were consistently significantly negatively related with 
expansion. It also supports the hypothesis that political climate has a stronger effect on 
expansion than ability to pay as the results of cost were consistently spottier and of lower 
statistical significance than political climate. It does not, however, provide much clear evidence 
to support the hypothesis that higher ability to pay increases the likelihood that a state will 
expand Medicaid. While these models are certainly not perfect, they do shed new light on the 
governors’ decisions, and peel the curtain back on what conditions may have led states with 
Republican executives to make differing decisions. One such condition appears to be that more 
conservative states are more likely to expand Medicaid. Numbers, however, can only tell us so 
much of the story behind decisions states make about their future. In order to get a better look 
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into the conditions that form different outcomes and to get a more holistic view of decisions and 
why they are made, the next chapter of this study will focus on taking a diving deeper into the 
conditions of two neighboring states that made separate decisions on expansion – North and 
South Dakota. 
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Chapter 4: Qualitative Study 
4.1 Methodology 
A qualitative study can give more nuance to the numbers presented in a quantitative 
study, especially when there is a lot of complexity to a topic, as suggested by the widely varying 
results of some of the models from above. In order to examine some of these complexities, I look 
at the conditions of North Dakota and South Dakota surrounding expansion. I believe North 
Dakota and South Dakota can be great cases for study; they certainly have some similarities, and 
to people who are familiar with the state, there is a recognition of a kind of kin-like relationship. 
Dusty Johnson	Chief of Staff for South Dakotan Governor Dennis Daugaard put it like this 
“Everybody knows North Dakota and South Dakota are like brothers—you may fight a lot, you 
may spar a lot, you may compare yourselves a lot—but you know deep down in your heart, at the 
end of the day, you’ve got a lot of things in common, and you get along and love each other, 
even when you’re fighting. And that’s certainly the case between the two states” (Ellenbolt, 
2013).  
As for politics, they look similar with around 40 percent of citizens identifying as 
conservative, similar conservative makeups in both upper and lower legislative chambers, and 
they both fall into the bottom 10 states on the state liberalism index (Gallup, Inc., 2017; National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2013; Gray, 2013). Even though all of this seems similar, for a 
variety of potential reasons, North Dakota expanded Medicaid in their state while South Dakota 
did not. Since these states are so similar on these political conditions mentioned above, this 
qualitative examination of these states seeks to examine four different factors that may have 
played a role in expansion decisions for these two states. These factors include: budget and 
economy, state of healthcare, demographics, and governor ideology. 
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4.2 Explanatory Variables 
4.2.1 Budget and Economy 
Cost was seemingly a big factor for South Dakota, and although state economy may not 
have played a significant role in the quantitative portion of this study, that is not to say it had no 
role at all. The role of cost and economy may be much more nuanced. North Dakota and South 
Dakota were by most metrics doing pretty well for themselves economically with respect to the 
other states in the union. In fact, in 2013 both economies ranked within the top 10 state 
economies according to CNBC; North Dakota’s economy was ranked second best in the nation, 
and South Dakota came in at number seven (CNBC LLC, 2013). Unemployment rates were low 
in each state, with North Dakota at 3.4 percent and South Dakota at a solid 4 percent. (CNBC 
LLC, 2013). But one interesting factor that is very different is GDP growth. In 2013, South 
Dakota’s GDP growth was fairly stagnant at 0.2 percent; however, it was booming in North 
Dakota at 13.4 percent growth (Hargreaves, 2013). In fact, North Dakota’s economy was 
growing at over five times the national average, and almost tripling Texas, its closest competitor, 
at 4.8 percent growth. Such intense growth helped to make North Dakota’s economy “the envy 
of virtually every other place in America” (Holeywell, 2011).  
South Dakota, on the other hand, had the fourth slowest growing economy. One factor 
that may have played into this low GDP was the blizzard that rushed through in October in that 
year. In 2013, South Dakota was subject to a major blizzard, with some parts of the state 
receiving up to 58 inches of snow fall (National Weather Service). The blizzard took a toll on 
many parts of South Dakota, but one place where it was particularly damaging was the cattle 
industry with up to 100,000 cattle have been reported dead from the storm (Miller, 2013). 
According to one estimate, 15 to 20% of all cattle were killed in parts of the state, and some 
THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION 36 
cattle rancher lost more than half of their herds (Walsh, 2013). One cow can be worth thousands 
of dollars, and many ranchers lost thousands to hundreds of thousands in assets due to the lost 
cattle. That means revenues coming from that industry were severely cut, and cattle is 34% of the 
agricultural industry, which is the largest industry in South Dakota.  
GDP growth is a really important thing to talk about when it comes to making decisions 
about future expenditures. In that way, GDP growth could play a serious factor in Medicaid 
expansion decisions because the very nature of expansion is something that depends on future 
ability for a state to pay. Since Medicaid expansion under the ACA was set up as to increase the 
amount a state pays as time goes on (stating with 0 percent of the cost of expansion, ending with 
10 percent by 2020), if future revenue streams do not seem particularly promising, then a state 
may be less inclined to expand due to fears that they will not be able to make up the costs in the 
future. 
And, it just-so-happened that future looked pretty good in North Dakota. North Dakota 
saw a monumental increase in GDP and that huge spike in growth can predominately be 
attributed to the oil boom. North Dakota experienced this oil boom thanks to the use of hydraulic 
fracturing (fracking) in the Bakken formation. Before the use of fracking, the oil trapped in the 
Bakken formation was difficult to extract, but following the takeoff of this method in the region, 
oil could be extracted in large quantities at a much lower cost (Rapier, 2017). This increase in oil 
production not only bettered the economy by increased the amount of money flowing through the 
state, but it also allowed North Dakota to capitalize on this production by placing a special tax on 
the industry, which helped to create the over a billion-dollar surplus for the state. This growth 
had led to increased funding for things like education and infrastructure, and even the governor 
himself attributes much of the improvement that has been made in the state to the oil revenue 
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(Sontag, 2014). And this revenue was not expected to stop any time soon either. According to 
some estimates, people were predicting that the boom could last over a century (Brown, 2013). 
That kind of growth in GDP mixed with the projected longevity could reassure a state and their 
governor that the funds to pay for any kind of budget expansion, like the one presented by 
Medicaid, would be taken care of in the future. These conditions abated many concerns about the 
stability of funding for such a program, and the state made it evident that they were aware of the 
state’s ability to sustain the program long term even with rising costs as Governor Dalrymple 
said through one of his spokesman “Rising health care costs are certainly a concern, but we still 
feel that the expansion is fiscally manageable and that it was the right thing to do for North 
Dakota” (Nowatzki, 2015).  
South Dakota was also seeing a surplus in their budget, though not for the same reasons. 
South Dakota had a surplus in their budget following the 2013 fiscal year due to underspending. 
Altogether, South Dakota spent approximately $10.6 million less than had been appropriated 
(Office of the Governor, 2013). One interesting way in which that money was saved was decline 
in Medicaid and CHIP enrollment. About $9.7 million of the expense reduction came from the 
almost zero percent enrollment in the ending months of the fiscal year (Office of the Governor, 
2013). Even though South Dakota had a surplus in the budget, the vast majority of that surplus 
was due to people not signing up for Medicaid. Having that kind of surplus come from low 
Medicaid enrollment might affect a state’s decision to expand. Savings like this can be very 
attractive, especially for politicians who can take credit for it, which Governor Daugaard did by 
announcing this success at the end of the 2013 fiscal year – stating “For the second year in a row, 
we maintained structural balance in our budget. This was my number one priority when I took 
office” (Office of the Governor, 2013). 
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If Governor Daugaard’s number one concern was in fact keeping the budget balanced, 
imposing Medicaid expansion could pose a serious challenge to that goal. Governor Daugaard 
made clear he would make no exception for Medicaid expansion when it came to increasing the 
budget, stating “I will not support expansion unless our savings cover costs anticipated next year, 
and every year through State Fiscal Year 2021” (Daugaard D. , 2015). Daugaard did his best to 
ensure that the state would not increase costs by implementing expansion while, on the other 
hand, Dalrymple reflected much less concern about increased spending falling onto the state, 
stating “We must make up the loss with state funds because cutting benefits to those in need of 
healthcare is not an option” (Dalrymple, 2013). These statements reflect how Daugaard routinely 
showed a deeper concern of regarding the cost of expansion than Dalrymple, viewpoints which 
may be representative of the differing economic conditions of each other these states. These 
results paint a clearer picture of the relationship cost and ability to pay may have with expansion, 
but it seems the weight of these considerations may be different for each state depending on the 
priorities of their governor. 
4.2.2 State of Health Care 
Generally speaking, health statistics from North Dakota and South Dakota are not 
drastically different. They both fall somewhere in the middle when it comes to behavioral health 
ranking, with North Dakota landing itself at 27th healthiest state and South Dakota at 32nd (Rom, 
2013). They also have similar vices when it comes to alcohol, both being in the worst five states 
for binge drinking (Rom, 2013). That said, even though they typically look similar when it 
comes to health, the two states seemed to be tackling different health related issued in the time 
surrounding expansion decisions. 
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The oil industry took a toll on the state of health care in the oil producing parts of North 
Dakota. Those populations were seeing the highest percentage increase of any state, meaning 
more people needing to be treated (Cicha, 2015). An article in the New York Times went over all 
of the increase in work place incidents, increase in usage of ambulances, and how many patients 
lack of insurance attributed to the $1.2 million in increased hospital debt – a 2000% increase 
over four years (Eligon, 2013). One doctor in North Dakota recounted the change in the hospital 
environment as “no longer small-town work… [it] has now been transformed from that of a 
small family practitioner to basically an E.R. doc” (Sontag, 2014). So the same oil boom that was 
increasing the economy so drastically was taking a huge toll on the health of the state. This 
manifested itself not only in accident injuries, but also in less predictable forms, like increased 
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases (Sontag, 2014). South Dakota, on the other hand, did 
not have any particularly difficult times in the health of citizens; however, they did have a scare 
from the blizzard. The carcasses of the cattle could have posed a potential outbreak of disease in 
the state, but nothing really came of it (Miller, 2013). Aside from that, South Dakotas health 
system seemingly had an average year for the health care industry in their state. 
That said, for all of the focus around the decrease in health conditions in North Dakota, 
the actual numbers are conflicting. Per capita personal health care spending (PHC) in North 
Dakota did not go up drastically surrounding the oil boom. In fact South Dakota and North 
Dakota had the same average annual change in PHC spending, a 5.8 percent increase on average 
every year (U.S. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). Even if you examine just 
the years surrounding the boom (2008 to 2013), North Dakota and South Dakota’s expenditures 
look strikingly similar with the average increase in PHC spending being 3.7 percent per year in 
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North Dakota and an average increase of 3.3 percent per year in North Dakota (U.S. Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014).  
Similarly, they did not look very different in aggregate changes in PHC spending either. 
The national average was a 20.3 percent increase from 2008 to 2012, but both of these states 
were above the national average. South Dakota’s aggregate PHC spending increase was 25.2 
percent, and North Dakota’s was 28.8 percent, about a 3.5 point difference from each other, and 
both higher than the typical state (U.S. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). This 
number could be important because it could imply that overall costs were rising in both of these 
states, but particularly in North Dakota. If the government took note of this cost going up over 8 
points faster a year than the average state, they might have been looking for someone to foot the 
bill, and the federal government at the time was offering to do that for a significant amount for 
the population. South Dakota may not have taken to this signal because they were not at far from 
the national average, and, as previously mentioned, Medicaid enrollment was staying pretty 
stagnant. It could be that, even though their PHC costs were going up faster than average, the 
state did not want to push Medicaid as the solution, because the state was saving upwards of $9 
million dollars from people not being on it (Office of the Governor, 2013).  
To further this possible explanation, North Dakota saw an above average increase (39.5 
percent) in state Medicaid expenditures from 2011 to 2012, almost 14 points over the average of 
the 19 state in this study (25.6 percent) (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2013). 
South Dakota, on the other hand, had seen a below average increase in state Medicaid 
expenditure of 23.2 percent (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2013). North 
Dakota’s increase in state Medicaid expenditures may have influenced the state to view the 
option of expansion more favorably, since it was becoming rapidly costlier to run the program. 
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Together, this rapid increase in the amount of money North Dakota was spending on Medicaid 
and the large amounts of projected growth may have caused North Dakotan politicians to (1) 
seek the immediate funds being offered by the federal government, and (2) having the 
confidence that they will be able to pay the increasing amounts of expansion when they come in 
the future. The second condition of fiscal confidence aligns with my hypothesis that a better 
ability to pay, the more likely the state is to expand Medicaid. 
4.2.3 Demographics 
 North Dakota and South Dakota have another thing in common, demographics. Both 
states are predominately white, with more than 85 percent of the population white in each state. 
Neither have large minority populations, but they each have an above average Native American 
makeup. When calculating the national average for percent Native American (alone or in 
combination) for each state using the 2010 census material, a state average for Native American 
make-up is around 2.6 percent of the population; however, North and South Dakotas’ Native 
American populations were 6.4 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively (Hoef, Vines, & Norris, 
2012). On average, North Dakota was over double the state average, and South Dakota almost 
four times the national average. This distinction is important when it comes to Medicaid 
expansion. For one, the uninsured rate for those who identify as American Indian or Alaska 
Native (AIAN) has always been higher than the national average. In 2013, the uninsured rate for 
AIAN non-elderly persons was 24 percent while the rate for non-elderly non-AIAN persons was 
only 16 percent (Foutz, Ubri, & Artiga, 2017). More than this, one in four AIAN adult persons 
are in a state Medicaid program, and approximately half of AIAN children are (Foutz, Ubri, & 
Artiga, 2017). And this number is even higher in South Dakota where an estimated 39 percent of 
AIAN individuals are on Medicaid compared to North Dakotas 26 percent (Fox & Boerner, 
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2012). In fact, South Dakota placed in second for highest AIAN Medicaid enrollment in the 
nation (Fox & Boerner, 2012). 
 In South Dakota, this was clearly on the minds of policy makers, particularly the 
governor. Governor Daugaard's two main concerns with the expansion are “keeping costs to the 
state low and ensuring that Native Americans in the state receive good care” (Ferguson D. , 
Daugaard weighing Medicaid expansion , 2015). In an attempt to accomplish both, the governor 
laid out a plan in 2015. Daugaard mentioned that South Dakota could save up to $67 million a 
year if the federal government fully fund the health care of Native American individuals in South 
Dakota (Governor's Column: Considering Our Options On Medicaid, 2015). The governor 
explained that when Medicaid eligible American Indians seek medical care from a private 
provider, rather than through the Indian Health Service, some of the costs of that care shift from 
the federal government to the state. He claims that through the various treaties and agreements 
made between the U.S. and the South Dakotan tribes, the federal government is required to pay 
for 100 percent of Native healthcare in the state. Daugaard proposed that, if the federal 
government were to do that, the savings the state would incur would allow the state to expand 
Medicaid in South Dakota (Daugaard D. , 2015).  
On the other hand, if Daugaard were to expand Medicaid without the federal government 
covering AIAN healthcare expenses, South Dakota would stand to put another 14,231 Native 
American individuals into the Medicaid program, of which South Dakota would have to foot part 
of the bill (Fox E. , 2011). This plan never succeeded, because it was dependent on the federal 
government agreeing to pay for 100 percent of Native American healthcare costs, no matter the 
medical provider they saw. In this way, Daugaard seems to have made his hierarchy of concerns 
clear. Keeping state costs low came before making sure Native Americans had good care. This 
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chapter has shown that demographics may have played more of a role than was led on by the 
quantitative study; however, this may be the hardest variable to generalize because many states 
do not have a large Native American population like the Dakotas do. 
4.2.4 Governor’s Ideology 
 North and South Dakota have an important distinction when it comes to their governors. 
While both governors are members of the Republican party, they have slightly different 
ideologies. When compared to other Republican governors, both seem to be on the more 
moderate side of things, and when it comes to their economic conservatism, South Dakotan 
governor Denis Daugaard and North Dakotan governor Jack Dalrymple are about the same; 
however, when it comes to social policy, Daugaard is recognized as more conservative than 
Dalrymple (OnTheIssues, 2018). For instance, Daugaard strongly opposes abortion, is an 
opponent of same-sex marriage, and has a hard-on-drugs stance (OnTheIssues, 2018). 
Dalrymple, on the other hand, tends to be quieter on issues of abortion and more liberal in drug 
policy (OnTheIssues, 2018). While these governors have varying opinions on many issues, both 
Governors do have some similar opinions on Medicaid expansion; both states were involved in 
suing the government for the implementation in the ACA back in 2010, they both signed a letter 
to President Obama requesting that he loosen the “one-size-fits-all” approach to Medicaid 
Expansion, and they both continually assured their constituents that those disabled persons and 
children would be taken care of by the state (Stewart, 2011; OnTheIssues, 2011; Dalrymple, 
2013; Duagaard, 2013). Despite the similarities, it is the differences in their opinions on the issue 
that may have contributed to the different decisions of the states.  
 When it comes to the role the government should have in healthcare, both governors 
believe the system should be more flexible, and they both seem to believe that it should be more 
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up to the state’s discretion than that of the federal government (OnTheIssues, 2011). Both are 
skeptical of federal intervention in their states, claiming that federal officials do not understand 
the circumstances of North and South Dakotans (Daugaard D. , 2011; Young, 2013). Governor 
Daugaard, however, seems to be more loyal to that opinion than Dalrymple.  
Governor Daugaard made many statements about expansion and about how it would only 
benefit healthy adults who he believes should not be aided by social assistance programs – 
stating “I want to stress that: these are able-bodied adults. They’re not disabled…They’re not 
children… These are adults — all of them” (Young, 2012). Governor Daugaard has made very 
clear his ideological commitment against government dependency and aiding the subset of 
person who conservatives have often labeled the “undeserving poor.” He has labeled his 
ideological problems with Medicaid expansion as just those two things, writing “It bothers me 
that some people who can work will become more dependent on government… [and] that a 
single adult could choose to go on Medicaid rather than work a minimum wage job to qualify for 
insurance on the health insurance exchange” (Daugaard D. , 2015). Aiding these individuals goes 
against the governor’s belief that persons should be working for what they have, which he holds 
to be a core tenant of personal fulfillment (Ferguson D. , 2018). He not only made his 
convictions evident through his words, but through his actions as well; in an attempt to keep the 
federal government out of South Dakotan Health care, Governor Daugaard sponsored two bills 
seeking to mitigate the roll the the federal government could play in regulating health insurance 
in the state (Daugaard D. , 2011). He has not let up on this opinion either, for just as recently as 
this year, he sought a work requirement for Medicaid (Ferguson D. , 2018).  
Dalrymple, on the other hand, still has these similar values, but despite convictions about 
the ACA being wrong for North Dakotans, Dalrymple abandoned those principles when 
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implementing Medicaid expansion – specifically, he claimed to “leave politics in the hallway 
when we make these decisions” (Young, 2013). Dalrymple originally favored a more market-
based solution to rising healthcare costs, but Dalrymple’s perspective on expansion was that the 
overwhelming amount of money that would come into the state trumped ideological 
considerations about expansion, stating “In the end, it comes down to are you going to allow 
your people to have additional Medicaid money that comes at no cost to us, or aren’t 
you?...We’re thinking, yes, we should” (Young, 2013). Dalrymple, instead of citing how 
Medicaid expansion causes dependency or provides unnecessary aid to those who could and 
should be working, claimed, “There really is no good reason to stand in the way of 20,000 North 
Dakotans having the opportunity to get health insurance coverage at no cost to themselves” 
(Grand Forks Herald, 2013). Unlike Daugaard, Dalrymple has consistently mentioned that he 
kept this decision removed from the political sphere, claiming the potential political 
consequences of expansion “has not entered my mind” (Grand Forks Herald, 2013).  
Daugaard and Dalrymple consistently made vastly different decisions when it came to 
healthcare policy and when making statements about what the government should be achieving 
in that sphere. Daugaard seemed to be more concerned with concerns of the federal government 
imposing itself too much onto South Dakotan’s lives, abetting the undeserving poor, and 
fostering government dependency. Dalrymple seemingly had different concerns in mind citing 
that “society is best measured by the way it treats its most vulnerable,” and creating programs in 
pursuit of that (OnTheIssues, 2011). Not only do their words attest to their policy positions, but 
the juxtaposition of Dalrymple’s actions with Daugaard’s speak volumes about their opinions as 
well, for while Governor Dalrymple was taking steps in the opposite direction by implementing 
large funding increases for nursing homes and home-based care, the South Dakotan governor 
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was signing budget bills to cut Medicaid rates for doctors, dentists, hospitals, and nursing homes, 
(OnTheIssues, 2011; Pear, 2011). Generally speaking, Daugaard’s attitude was much more rigid 
and unforgiving when it came to his demands for what expansion should look like, while 
Dalrymple had a much more relaxed attitude towards expansion. Daugaard’s actions were 
indicative of a person asking “why?” – while Dalrymple’s actions asked “why not?” 
4.3 Findings 
 Altogether, conditions in the states in these seemingly similar states were very different 
in important ways surrounding expansion. The abilities to pay of these states looked different, 
the state of healthcare in each state was facing varying challenges, the needs of states’ 
populations were different, and the governors of these states had both different outlooks and 
different concerns. It seems as though the North Dakotan governor was facing an economy that 
had enough resources to implement the program and showed no sign of slowing down. These 
conditions mixed with the state’s desperate need of a solution to the increase in emergency 
hospital visits and increasing hospital debts presented more favorable conditions for Medicaid 
expansion in North Dakota. Medicaid expansion was something that would prevent hospitals 
from taking on more uncompensated care, and ensure the increasing amounts of people visiting 
the hospital would be able to receive treatment for “no cost to themselves” (Grand Forks Herald, 
2013). In this way, Medicaid expansion presented a needed solution in North Dakota for a 
problem South Dakota was not having.  
This solution was able to come to fruition by the state governor who was seemingly less 
concerned with costs – possibly due to the favorable economic conditions in his state – and more 
concerned with providing additional care to his constituency. Due to his perspective that society 
should prioritize helping those in need and his readiness for the state to make up the costs, 
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Medicaid expansion was a program Governor Dalrymple was willing to implement in his state; 
however, South Dakota did not have these same conditions. It had a more stagnant economy and 
a governor who did not see Medicaid expansion as a way to help people in need, but rather a way 
to foster government dependency of able-bodied working-age age adults in South Dakota. South 
Dakota was not in need of a solution to some uptick in uncompensated care or hospital debt; 
instead, due to low growth in the state, South Dakota needed a way to pay for the increase 
expansion would cause in the budget. For this reason, the governor looked for ways to lower the 
cost of expansion such as convincing the federal government to pay for Native American 
healthcare costs. More than this however, the governor himself showed more concerned for the 
way Medicaid would increase the federal government’s role in South Dakotan’s healthcare, abet 
the undeserving poor, and fostering government dependency than Governor Dalrymple. These 
deeper concerns arguably weighed heavier on Daugaard’s cost-benefit analysis of expansion, 
which may have ultimately led to his attitudes being more “show me the good” than Governor 
Dalrymple’s “show me the harm” attitude.  
These results support the self-interest component Mayhew popularized by nature of the 
North Dakotan governor meeting the needs of hospitals and injured persons in his state in the 
face of the healthcare challenges being seen in his state (Mayhew, 1974). His response to a 
problem faced by his constituency could be seen as a reaction of a governor trying to get 
reelected; however, these results also show the kinds of concerns for good policy Fenno asserted 
(Fenno, 1978). The differing perspectives of the governors about what was good policy for their 
state made a difference in the decisions they ultimately made about expansion. This supports the 
view that political decision making being some combination of the two. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 Altogether, it seems as though, even in states where partisanship is similar, there is a 
spectrum. In states that are less conservative, there is a higher chance of expansion. This serves 
as evidence that Medicaid expansion is a highly politicized issue. The welfare state has long been 
criticized by the right, and in states where the legislature has more Republicans and the 
constituency is more conservative, expansion is less likely to catch on. Under a model of 
political decision making like the one Mayhew presents, it may seem like a strong political move 
for governors to reject Medicaid expansion because it promotes the idea that they are anti-big-
government, which provides the evidence to the electorate that the governor is holding fast to the 
values of his/her party’s principles and increases a politician’s chances of getting reelected. On 
the other hand, in states with more Democrats in the legislature and a more liberal constituency, 
appearing to be more moderate and appealing to the social programs that leftist individuals are in 
favor of may provide them with evidence to share with their more left-wing constituents that 
they share similar values and are working in their best interests and increases a politician’s 
chances of getting reelected.  
 Cost similarly has an effect, though perhaps a more complex one. The study found mixed 
results on the topic of ability to pay. In one model it found that states with worse economies are 
more likely to expand. This could be due to a desire from the state in increase the amount of 
federal funding it receives in an attempt to boost the economy. Another model suggest that the 
results as a package do not have a result on their own, but are significant when measured in 
congruence with political climate. These mixed results make the effects of cost on Medicaid 
expansion less clear, but the qualitative study suggests that it may have more to do with the 
governor’s perception of costs rather than actual economic conditions. Further studies could 
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examine perceptions of cost between political officials and determine whether or not that has an 
effect on the propensity of those officials to accept federal funds or increase expenditure. 
 As for the reasons experienced in the qualitative portion of this study, leaders of states 
can seemingly genuinely have ideological commitments like those presented by Governor 
Daugaard of more local government, less government dependency, and more people achieving 
work as a core tenant of personal fulfillment or Governor Dalrymple’s assertion that society 
should be helping it’s most vulnerable. These personal commitments may come in conflict with 
policies or serve to validate them for politicians. These personal commitments may create 
differing orientations of governors to the problems they are faced with and lead them to differing 
solutions. The evidence of personal ideological differences between the governors which align 
with the different paths each state took provide evidence to the second theory of political 
decision making wherein governors desire to create good public policy, and their ideas of what 
that are differ. In this way, the differing positions of the governors on Medicaid expansion may 
not be derived purely for a desire to please their constituency, but also from different 
perspectives of what is genuinely good for their state. It appears that Governor Daugaard 
believes that Medicaid is not good policy because it fosters dependency which is bad for society 
while Governor Dalrymple is more open to the idea because he has showed more personal 
commitment in healthcare aid to help the worst-off because that is how society should measure 
success.  
 The results of this research suggest that the most important factor that influenced 
Medicaid expansion decisions was political climate. More conservative states are less likely to 
expand Medicaid. This could have implication on future policy. One way to overcome this 
hurdle in future policy, these results suggest, is to make a stronger effort will to either make laws 
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unpartisan or bipartisan. This would involve much compromise, and further research would need 
to be done to determine how that could be done; however, in this polarized political climate, it is 
hard to imagine there is much hope for that solution to gain much traction. A second solution 
would be to make policy more flexible. Section 1115 waivers in the ACA do allow a kind of 
flexibility that has gotten many Republican states on board with expansion; however, it did not 
do enough to get every state to participate. Policy in the future could potentially give more 
options to states that would allow them to create solutions which remove any strong association 
to political party. A problem with Medicaid expansion is that it is such a highly politicized issue. 
Giving states a way to rebrand some form of expansion and dissociate it from the the Democratic 
party might give it a chance in more conservative atmospheres. In order for policy to be 
successful in the future, politicians should be careful either to craft it in a way that will be 
acceptable to both sides or to create more options for states.  
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